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Migration between Greece and Turkey:  
from the “Exchange of Populations” to non-recognition of borders 
 
Martin Baldwin-Edwards 
 
Migration between Greece and Turkey – in either direction – carries with it multiple connotations 
concerning national identity and allegiance, ethnicity, and even the existence of agreed and 
defined national borders. Thus, there is relatively little migration, touristic or otherwise, between 
the two countries; indeed, the most pressing migration concern for both Greece and Turkey is that 
of clandestine migration and asylum-seekers. This concern is also shared by other EU countries, 
which see both Greece and Turkey as primary transit routes for illegal migration to northern 
Europe. 
 
The stage is set with a brief description of the 1920’s “exchange of populations” between Greece 
and Turkey, and the contemporary legacy and its implications. Following this, I examine what is 
known about recent illegal migrations across the Greek-Turkish border, such as principal points of 
entry to Turkey and known points of entry into Greece. Specific issues such as the notorious 
minefields along the River Evros (Meric, in Turkish), and the poorly-functioning Greek-Turkish 
Readmission Agreement of 2001, are examined in the light of recent data, along with evaluation of 
the recent Turkish claims of illegal migration from Greece into Turkey. Finally, I offer an overall 
picture of the situation, suggesting that interstate relations constitute a core component of the 
management of unauthorized migration flows. The strained nature of recent Greek-Turkish 
relations has negative implications not only for migration management, but also for the human 
rights of illegal migrants and asylum-seekers in the Near East. 
 
 
The Asia Minor atrocities and the “Exchange of Populations” 
Toward the end of the Greek Army’s disastrous three-year Asia Minor campaign, the region’s 
Christian population fled as terrified refugees to various ports around the city of Smyrna in Asia 
Minor. The Turks entered Smyrna in September 1922, and eye-witness accounts testify to the 
violence and horrors which rapidly ensued – although not only from the Turkish side 
(Pentzopoulos, 1962: 46). Hundreds of thousands of refugees arrived at Greek ports, destitute, 
starving and desperate for assistance. Since the fighting had indirectly involved the Great Powers, 
an armistice was rapidly signed by the British (thus averting an Anglo-Turkish war) and there was 
a call for a peace conference at Lausanne. Such was the background to the Lausanne Conference 
and the Exchange of Population Conventions of 1923. 
 
Throughout the Ottoman period, although the “millet” system had tried to enforce different 
statuses according to religion (Roudometof, 1998), the population exhibited multiple and complex 
identities that ill-suited emerging nation-states such as Greece, Bulgaria and later Turkey. 
Language, for example, was not a defining feature: many Greeks in Asia Minor (known as 
Karamanli) actually spoke Turkish which they wrote in Greek script. Others spoke Greek but 
notated it in Arabic or Latin characters; and many ethnic groups, such as Vlach, spoke Greek but 
refused to be called Greeks.  Local identities, or class identities, tended to be as important as 
language or ethnic identity. Even religion, which clearly divided the population into Muslim and 
Christian, was less divisive than might be imagined. Religion in the Balkans was to some extent a 
pragmatic issue, riddled with superstition whilst trying to minimize risk and hardship – at the 
extreme, representing a form of insurance rather than devotion to the religion’s fundamental 
beliefs. There was also significant intermarriage between Christians and Muslims, multiple 
conversions between religions, and adoption of various Islamic practices by the Christian 
population (Mazower, 2003: 70-71). Throughout the Ottoman period, there was “a large number 
of ethnic groups… [with] intricacy, variability and fluidity of ethnic categorization and 
identification” (Vermeulen, 1984: 226). 
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Kemal, the leader of the new Turkish nation state, insisted that there was no place for Christian 
minorities in the republic – with the clear problem that Greece, already badly drained by wars, 
might collapse under the strain of accepting over one million refugees into a population of 4.5 
million (Clark, 2006: 46). After difficult and dramatic negotiations, a final peace settlement was 
made with Turkey on 24 July, 1923. A component part of the Treaty had already been signed in 
January and this document was the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations which was the 
first time in history that a compulsory transfer of a large number of people was officially adopted 
for solving a minority problem. International response to it was mixed, with many commentators 
viewing the procedure as barbaric and a dangerous precedent, whilst others saw it as a realistic 
policy and subsequently advocated similar ideas in the years preceding World War II 
(Pentzopoulos, 1962: 53). 
 
According to the Treaty, all Turkish nationals of the Greek Orthodox religion established on Turkish 
territory (other than Constantinople) and all Greek nationals of Muslim religion established on 
Greek territory (other than the newly-acquired region of Western Thrace) were to be forcibly 
exchanged. Thus, the distinguishing criterion chosen for compulsory resettlement was exclusively 
that of religion: the result was that a minimum of 1.3 million Greeks were expelled from Turkey 
and some 500,000 Muslims were sent to Turkey. All were dispossessed of their property – which, 
in the case of many of the bourgeois Greek refugees was substantial – and this loss of property 
was subsequently confirmed by the Ankara Treaty of 1930. The Lausanne negotiations had left 
some 150-200,000 “Greeks” in Constantinople and a similar number of Muslims in Western Thrace; 
the Treaty stipulates the legal obligations and other conditions imposed on the country hosting 
each minority. These conditions still pertain. 
 
 
After Lausanne… 
The Muslims left in Western Thrace were not of one clear ethnic group, but cast in the Treaty as 
the official Minority of Greece; in reality, it consists of at least three groups. These are Anatolian 
Turkish-speaking migrants who settled in the region in the Ottoman period; various native 
populations, such as Pomaks, who converted to Islam in the 16-17
th centuries and are slavophone; 
and Roma, some of whom are Rom-speaking (Dragona, 2004: 170). As the Lausanne Treaty 
effectively froze in time the socio-religious structures of 1923, the Muslims of Western Thrace 
(unlike those in Turkey) have mufti who alongside their religious role also have civil and judicial 
functions. Furthermore, the mufti  are not elected but are appointed directly by the Greek state – 
a system opposed by the residents who frequently elect their own unrecognized mufti. Over the 
twentieth century, the economic situation of the Minority has remained dire whilst Greeks in the 
region have prospered. Numerous repressive measures adopted by the Greek authorities, including 
the notorious removal of their Greek citizenship from those who dared to travel to Turkey, have 
inclined even the non-Turkish speaking component of the Minority into public identification as 
Turkish. Throughout the Ottoman period, Christians had informally referred to non-Arab Muslims 
(e.g. Kurds, Turks, Albanians) as “Turks” (Quataert, 2000: 173); despite this long tradition, such 
identification is prohibited under Greek law and they can only identify themselves as Muslims. 
 
By the late twentieth century, the number of Greek Muslims was unknown owing to state 
connivance in data collection, such as not asking the appropriate questions in censuses. Academic 
estimates for Thrace range from 115,000 to 130,000 of which at least 48% are Turkish-speaking 
(Dragona, 2004: 170-1). There is also a sizeable number of the official Minority who left Thrace, 
because of the poor economic conditions there, and relocated in the Greater Athens area: again, 
there are no data. Unlike their kin in Thrace, these Muslims are not protected by the Lausanne 
Convention and have no rights concerning religious freedoms, such as access to mosques or the 
correct funeral rites. Currently, there are no mosques permitted outside of Thrace and no 
possibility of other than Orthodox funeral rites: even Christian requests for cremation are denied. 
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If the situation of the Minority in Greece seems bad, it has been arguably worse for Greeks in 
Turkey. Just the number of remaining Greeks in Istanbul, who were at a minimum of 150,000 in 
1923, is indicative: despite the presence of the globally-important Orthodox Patriarchate, there are 
now fewer than 2,000 mostly elderly people constituting the Greek Orthodox minority there. The 
mass exodus of population occurred twice: in 1955, over tensions in Cyprus when Turkish mobs 
ran amok in Istanbul’s Greek neighbourhoods; and again over Cyprus, in 1964, when Turkey 
expelled several thousands of resident Greek nationals (Clark, 2006: 88). Throughout the 
twentieth century there have been continuous disputes between the Patriarchate and the Turkish 
state, too numerous to discuss here, but which reflect an essentially repressive environment for 
the Christian minority. 
 
Both countries’ treatments of each other’s minorities over the twentieth century have clearly been 
less than required by contemporary international standards, although both Greece and Turkey 
insist that they have followed the Lausanne Treaty to the letter. However, the very limited 
migration between the two countries indicates the persistence of religious-ethnic divisions – most 
of which were actually manufactured by leading Greek and Turkish politicians prior to, and during, 
the Lausanne negotiations. By 2006, there were some 1,000 Turkish nationals with valid residence 
permits living in Greece, although nearly 8,000 (presumably Kurdish asylum-seekers with various 
statuses) declared themselves as Turkish in the 2001 Census. Schengen visas granted by Greece 
for temporary visits of Turkish nationals are also few – some 44,000 in 2003. These are very small 
numbers, for a country the size of Turkey adjoining a relatively prosperous EU country. 
 
 
Illegal transit migration through Turkey into Greece 
Detected irregular migration through Turkey, according to Turkish official data, peaked in 2000 
and apparently has been in decline since. Turkey, and Istanbul in particular, is a focal point for 
illegal migration from the Middle East; entry points are mainly on the Iranian and Iraqi borders, 
such as Van province (Icduygu and Toktas, 2002: 33). Transit migrants tend to be from the Middle 
East (Iran and Iraq) and Asia (Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka) and Africa (Nigeria, Somalia, Rep. 
of Congo) (Icduygu, 2004a: 8). Table 1 shows the principal source countries of transit migrants for 
the period 2000-05. 
 
Table 1 
Apprehended transit migrants in Turkey, 2000-05, top five source 
countries   
Country of 
origin  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005  TOTAL 
Iraq  17,280 18,846 20,926 3,757 6,393 3,591 70,793 
Pakistan  5,027 4,829 4,813 6,258 9,396 11,001 41,324 
Afghanistan  8,746 9,701 4,246 2,178 3,442 2,363 30,676 
Iran  6,825 3,514 2,508 1,620 1,265 1,141 16,873 
Bangladesh  3,228 1,497 1,810 1,722 3,271 1,524 13,052 
Others  53,408 53,978 48,522 40,684 27,380 24,221 248,193 
TOTALS  94,514 92,365 82,825 56,219 51,147 43,841 420,911 
         
SOURCE: Icduygu, 2006: Table 4       
 
 
The departure points from Turkey are mostly in the West – either in the coastal areas such as the 
provinces of Istanbul and Izmir, or close to the border with Greece, such as Edirne province 
(Icduygu and Toktas, 2002: 32). More recently, there is informal evidence of illegal migration into 
Bulgaria and then on to Greece (Yaghmaian, 2005). The proportion of migrants taking each route 
varies, according to the effectiveness of border controls at the time: for example, as patrols 
around the Greek islands increased, more illegal migrants attempted to cross into Greece through 
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the landborder of the River Evros. Table 2 gives some recent unpublished data on apprehensions 
by the Greek authorities. 
 
 
Table 2 
Detected illegal entries into 
Greece, 2004-6       
 
Total border 
arrests [land 
+ sea] 
caught on Gr-
Tur border 
[land + sea] 
% detained 
on Gr-Tur 
border 
arrested on 
Gr-Tur 
landborder 
only 
% arrested on 
landborder 
out of total Gr-
Tur arrests 
arrested on 
Gr-Tur 
seaborder 
only 
2004 15,182 6,985  46.0 2,957 42.3 4,028 
2005 26,919 7,944  29.5 3,706 46.7 4,238 
2006 n.d.  17,096    12,178 71.2 4,918 
           
SOURCE: Ministry of Public Order data      
 
 
As can be seen from the Table, border apprehensions by the Greek authorities have been 
increasing markedly for the landborder with Turkey, from 7,000 in 2004 to 17,000 in 2006. 
Apprehensions by the coastguard have remained at a constant level over the least few years, 
although the above data for the Greek-Turkish coastal area are inconsistent with smaller numbers 
for all of Greece, from the Ministry of Merchant Marine.  
 
The landborder with Turkey was defended with landmines in 1974, after the Turkish invasion of 
Cyprus. Since 2004, Greece has been a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty, and information has 
only recently been made available. Out of a total of just over 1.5 million landmines of various 
types, 24,751 anti-personnel mines were recorded on the River Evros minefield bordering Turkey; 
by April 2006, 10,002 of these had been cleared in accordance with Greece’s treaty obligations 
(Landmine Monitor Report, 2006). Additionally, measures were taken in 2005 and 2006 to 
reinforce existing double-fenced perimeters with barbed wire, in order to prevent illegal 
immigrants from cutting through. Over the period 2001-5, Landmine Monitor reported 67 
casualties, of which 47 were killed and 20 injured; most of these were aliens. The Ministry of 
Defence estimates that between 1987 and 2004, 66 people were killed and 149 injured on the 
Evros minefields (Landmine Monitor Report, 2006). A record of injuries from the River Evros is 
maintained by the University Hospital of Alexandroupolis, which over the period 1991-2003 treated 
169 cases out of which 15 were dead on arrival, 4 died after arrival and 48 were severely injured 
(Anagnostoulis et al., 2006). Presumably, the total number of deaths over this period is the sum of 
the two sources, i.e. 66+19=85; moreover, the increased annual rate of deaths since 2000, as 
recorded by Landmine Monitor, is probably related to increased illegal migrant crossings of the 
border. 
 
 
Distinguishing asylum-seekers from illegal migrants 
Since there is no lawful way for asylum-seekers to arrive in Greece, and also no practical way to 
arrive as migrant workers, all asylum-seekers arrive in Greece in the same way as do illegal 
migrants. Roughly half of asylum-seekers in Greece over the last decade are nationals of Iraq, 
Turkey and Iran – of which, the majority are Kurds who arrived in three waves after 1990 
(Papadopoulou, 2004: 170). Apart from those who are detained at the border, there are 
presumably also large numbers who escape detection. However, many do not apply for asylum in 
Greece for several reasons. Since 2001, the recognition rate – even for clearly vulnerable 
nationalities – has been the lowest in the EU, e.g. 0.3% for 2002 (Papadopoulou, 2003). Secondly, 
the reception conditions and general treatment of refugees iare amongst the worst in Europe, so 
there is little point in struggling to achieve the status. Thirdly, by registering with the Greek 
authorities the asylum-seekers deprive themselves of the right to apply in another EU country: 
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thus, their intention is frequently to “move on” to a more hospitable environment (Papadopoulou, 
2003: 350-2). Others, most notably Kurds, feel at home in the Greek culture and economy, owing 
to similarities with their own experiences: they are more likely to stay and try to integrate into 
Greek society. Recent research has noted the supportive role for Turkish and other Middle Eastern 
asylum seekers by Greek society, particularly in those areas populated by the descendants of the 
1923 Population Exchange (Papadopoulou, 2004: 178). Overall, however, it is extremely difficult to 
distinguish between genuine asylum cases and economic migrants, owing to the massive overlap 
between these categories. Furthermore, the number of recognized refugees remains unknown but 
is thought to be diminishing, rather than increasing, as so few new awards are made and 
previously recognized refugees either leave Greece or become illegal immigrants. Similar problems 
are found in Turkey, with respect to asylum policy (Baldwin-Edwards, 2005). 
 
 
The Greek-Turkish Rapprochement 
In late 1999, what has been termed “earthquake diplomacy” took hold of Greece and Turkey 
(Morris, 2005: 117). For the first time since 1923, Greeks and Turks found their common roots in 
400 years of shared destiny, ultimately leading to Greek support for Turkey application to join the 
EU. At the same time, regional initiatives were being developed by SECI and the Stability Pact for 
combating transborder crime: thus it was that Greece and Turkey came to sign in 2000 an 
Agreement on Combating Crime, Especially Terrorism, Organized Crime, Illicit Drug Trafficking and 
Illegal Immigration (Icduygu, 2004b: 308). In 2001, the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey 
signed a Protocol on detailed co-operation procedures between the Ministry of Public Order, in 
Greece, and the Interior Ministry, in Turkey, for the readmission of citizens of either country or of 
a third country, who enter either country unlawfully.  
 
The Readmission Agreement was slow to start, although Greece was keen to control more 
effectively the eastern border. By 2006, it became clear that although Turkey was accepting some 
readmissions, there were considerable delays and problems. According to the Greek authorities, 
between April 2002 and November 2006, they had submitted 1892 cases (covering 23,689 aliens) 
out of which Turkey accepted to take back 2,841 persons, but in reality took only 1,463. Table 3 
shows data for the last three years. 
 
Table 3 
Requests for readmission to 
Turkey   
  No requested  No. readmitted  % 
2004 4,006  119  3.0
2005 1,992  152  7.6
2006 2,055  73  3.6
 
SOURCE: Ministry of Public Order data 
 
 
Amongst problems mentioned by the Greek state, are complaints that the Turkish side has not 
been implementing certain specific articles of the Protocol. In particular, Article 12 designating six 
border posts for readmission is not being applied, as all transfers have to be made at Evros; this 
involves significant transport and other costs for the Greek side. Greece also complains that the 
compensation of €75 per immigrant is on occasion increased to €400 or even €1,000, without 
basis in the Protocol. An additional issue, which is counterintuitive, is that Turkey claims 
readmission to Greece of some 8,000 illegal migrants who crossed into Turkey from Greece over 
the period 2002-2006. Given the serious lack of real information and independent analysis, it is 
difficult to comment upon any of these issues. Certainly, the complexity of illegal border-crossing 
in the region, along with the rapidly-changing strategies of the smugglers, makes it possible that 
migrants are crossing into Turkey from Greece. The most likely scenario would be that they had 
originally transited through Turkey and Bulgaria, and mistakenly crossed the River Evros again. 
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However, the numbers are rather high for such a geographical error to be made repeatedly. A 
more powerful explanation can be found in various reports, some of which have been 
substantiated by UNHCR, that both Greek and Turkish border police routinely expel migrants 
across the River Evros (Yaghmaian, 2005). In one case, the Turkish authorities forced 200 Africans 
to sign a document in Turkish, saying that they had entered Turkey through Greece (BBC News, 
24 July, 2001). More recently, there have been press reports of immigrants drowning in the river 
after being denied access to both Greek and Turkish territory. 
 
 
The primacy of interstate relations in migration management 
Since the rejection of the Annan Plan for Cyprus, and the extreme difficulties for Turkey in 
accommodating Cypriot demands for border and port recognition, Greek-Turkish relations have 
soured. The rapprochement which seemed to herald a new era has been, at least temporarily, 
scuppered; as throughout the post-WW II period, it is again over Cyprus. There are also disputes 
with Greece over territory and Aegean borders, which apparently is one cause of the problem with 
border posts in the Readmission Protocol. Yet, the Protocol was agreed and signed in 2001. 
 
The logical conclusion is that state relations are paramount, not only for the management of the 
common borders but also for the protection of ethnic minority groups in each other’s territory. The 
damage to the human rights of illegal migrants may seem a minimal cost to both Greece and 
Turkey, but there is also damage to the reputation of both countries. The inability of an EU 
member state to guarantee appropriate behaviour from its border guard is a serious deficit, and 
one which is increasingly being noted in European and international circles. Similarly, the failure of 
Turkey to respect fundamental rights (or, for that matter, the provisions of the Readmission 
Protocol) is hardly a positive contribution to its EU membership bid.  
 
Despite the positive changes which began in 1999, there is still a sense that both Greece and 
Turkey are stuck in some strange time-warp, located in 1923, which hardly serves any purpose. 
On the basis of nationalist ideology, which a century ago was needed for the formation of new 
nation states but is now dysfunctional, Greece and Turkey fail to co-operate and, ultimately, fail to 
act in their own interests. 
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